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I. Introduction
With the change of administration in the United States, trade negotiations came to a
near standstill in 2009. There was little to no discernable progress in the Doha round of
World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, and despite Russia's efforts to the con-
trary, no new members joined the WTO. Dispute settlement activity was also subdued,
with a considerable decrease in both the number of initiations and the number of Appel-
late Body and Panel Reports issued. The controversy over the so-called "zeroing" meth-
odology continued to represent a large portion of the Dispute Settlement Body's (DSB)
agenda in 2009, while the remainder of the DSB's attention was focused almost exclusively
on two challenges launched by the United States against China on intellectual property
rights and distribution services for reading materials and audiovisual entertainment
products.
Several high-profile agency actions grabbed headlines in 2009, including the Section
421 safeguard remedy action against Chinese tire imports, which represented the first
time a U.S. President had affirmed a U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) deter-
mination and imposed the special safeguards on China. Also drawing attention was the
Commerce Department's (Commerce) initiation of the first countervailing duty (CVD)
investigation on exports from Vietnam, despite the fact that Vietnam is treated as a non-
market economy (NME) country in antidumping (AD) investigations and administrative
reviews. Commerce also articulated a new methodology for determining costs on a quar-
terly basis.
In 2009, in several trade cases, the U.S. courts generally affirmed that broad deference
is due to administrative agency authority to interpret U.S. international trade laws. The
Supreme Court deferred to Commerce's decision regarding the applicability of AD laws
to transactions structured as the sale of services. Likewise, several decisions by the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) used generous language to describe
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the latitude of administrative agencies in interpreting the law. At the Court of Interna-
tional Trade (CIT), however, the issue of application of CVD laws to NMEs brought a
remand to Commerce to square its inconsistent positions and ensure that the same unfair
trade act was not double-counted in applying U.S. import duties.
II. Negotiation Developments
While the Obama administration put its trade team into place, trade negotiations came
to a near standstill in 2009. As high-profile trade issues such as the Section 421 safeguard
remedy action against Chinese tire imports were grabbing headlines, the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), led by Ambassador Ron Kirk, stepped back and con-
ducted a review of all U.S. trade policy and ongoing negotiations. The result was a year
with few developments in trade negotiations.
A. WTO NEGOTIATIONS
1. Doha Round
There was no discernible progress in the Doha Development Round negotiations in
2009. Despite high-level commitments to complete the round in 2010, there was little
movement on substance.] In September, India hosted a meeting for trade ministers in
order to jump-start the talks, resulting in an agreement to draft a work plan for the re-
mainder of the year with an eye toward completing negotiations the following year.2
Later that month, leaders at the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh reiterated their support for
conclusion of the round in 2010, directing their ministers to "take stock of the situation no
later than early 2010."3 In October, Brazil tried to revitalize the talks by organizing an
informal meeting of trade ministers before the formal ministerial meeting at the WTO in
Geneva at the end of November.4
A major stumbling block to the Doha Round during 2009 was the perceived reluctance
on the part of the United States to commit to the December 2008 agriculture and non-
agricultural market access (NAMA) draft texts.5 Developing countries want the agricul-
ture and NAMA texts from 2008 to be the basis for future negotiations, while U.S. indus-
try strongly opposes proceeding from these texts. 6 The United States took the position
that bilateral negotiations were necessary in conjunction with multilateral talks "to move
1. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Highlight 'Mismatch' in Doha Ambitions: U.S. Cites Mixed Pro-
gress, Irr'L TRADE REPORTER, July 30, 2009; Jonathan Lynn, More Meetings, No Movement in Intense Doha
Trade Talks, REUTERS, Sept. 18, 2009, httpi/www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58H3II20090918; Lamy Ac-
knowledges Failure of Senior Officials to Advance Doha Round, 27 LNsIDE U.S. TRADE 42, Oct. 30, 2009.
2. India Ministerial Yields Commitment to Ramp Up Doha Talks This Month, LNSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept 4,
2009.
3. Statement, Group of Twenty; Leader's Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit 1 49 (Sept. 25, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/documents/organization/129853.pdf.
4. Brazil Organizing November Ministerial Side Meeting To Discuss Doba, 27 INsIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 2,
2009.
5. India Ministerial Yields Commitment to Ramp up Doba Talks This Month, supra note 2.
6. Id.
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the Doha talks into an endgame."7 The United States held bilateral consultations with
several key countries (including Brazil and India) to explore what additional concessions
could be gained, particularly with respect to tariff cuts in proposed sectoral commitments
and flexibilities for the special safeguard mechanism for developing countries.8 Disagree-
ments on services negotiations also arose this year. WTO Director-General Lamy backed
the U.S. demand that services concessions be revealed before final agreement on agricul-
ture and NAMA modalities.9 This sequencing is opposed by several other countries that
believe services concessions should come after agriculture and NAMA modalities are final-
ized, as laid out in an annex to the 2005 Hong Kong ministerial.' 0
2. Accession Negotiations
While the WTO had no new members join this year, Russia's sixteen-year bid for
membership garnered much attention. In June, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
announced that Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan would each drop their separate member-
ship bids to instead form a customs union and enter the WTO in that manner." WTO
rules provide that "any State or separate customs territories possessing full autonomy in
the conduct of its external commercial relations" and of matters covered by the WTO
Agreements may apply for membership.12 Many questioned whether joint entry was pos-
sible given that the planned customs union between the three countries would not meet
the WATO's definition of a customs territory.' 3 It was also unclear how each country's
already concluded bilateral accession agreements would be dealt with in a joint acces-
sion. 14 These questions were laid to rest in October when the three countries abandoned
their plans to join as a customs union and resumed their individual accession
negotiations.i 5
7. Press Release, Office of U.S. Trade Representative, United States Trade Representative Ron Kirk
Comments at Close of WTO Ministers' Meeting in New Delhi, India (Sept. 4, 2009), available at http://www.
ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/september/united-states-trade-representative-ron-kirk-
comm.
8. See U.S. Ramps Up Bilateral Meetings on Doha Round With Key Countries, 27 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 39, Oct.
9,2009; Bilaterals Continue with U.S., WASH. TRADE DAILY, Oct. 12, 2009; U.S., Brazil Make Slow Progress in
Second Doha Bilateral Meeting, 27 INSIDE US TRADE 40, Oct. 16, 2009; Another Senior Officials Meeting,
WASH. TRADE DAILY, Oct. 17, 2009.
9. Lamy To Work On Services Commitments Compromise In Doha Round, 27 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 40, Oct. 16,
2009.
10. Id.
11. Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan to Seek WTO Membership Together, ITAR-TASs NEws AGENCY,June 9,2009.
12. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. XXII, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 1.L.M. 1144 (1994).
13. Daniel Pruzin, WTO: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan Will Push Ahead On Joint Membership As Questions
Grow, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 849, June 25, 2009.
14. Id.
15. Daniel Pruzin, WTO: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan Abandon Plan For Joint WTO Accession as Customs
Union, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1426, Oct. 22, 2009.
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B. BILATERAL/REGIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
1. Bilateral Investment Treaties
The U.S. State Department and the USTR began a review of the 2004 U.S. Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) in 2009, to ensure that it is "consistent with the public
interest and the overall U.S. economic agenda."' 6 In September following comments and
public meetings,' 7 the State Department's Advisory Committee on International Eco-
nomic Policy (ACIEP) presented a report on recommendations to the government for
consideration in its review."' ACIEP's report was focused on investor-state dispute settle-
ment, state-owned enterprises, and financial services provisions. But it provided little
agreement on whether and to what extent change was needed in these areas. The biggest
area of divergence was on dispute settlement, with labor and manufacturing representa-
tives on the committee contending that the 2004 model overly favors investors and other
business representatives supporting the current provisions as a necessary protection. 9
The United States launched BIT negotiations with India and Mauritius in 2009.20 BIT
negotiations were also ongoing with China, Pakistan, and Georgia this year.21 The State
Department cautioned that it would not conclude any of these negotiations until the re-
view of the model BIT was completed.22
2. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
The United States continued negotiations on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agree-
ment (ACTA) that was launched in 2008, aiming to complete negotiations in 2010.23 Dis-
cussions focused on international cooperation and enforcement practices, particularly of
digital intellectual property rights. 24 The enforcement provisions of the ACTA are
16. See Press Release, Office of U.S. Trade Representative, Public Meeting Regarding the U.S. Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty Review (July 30, 2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/
press-releases/2009/july/public-meeting-regarding-us-model-bilateral-investmen.
17. Notice of Public Meeting and Solicitation of Written Comments, 74 Fed. Reg. 34,071 (uly 14, 2009)
(issued by the U.S. Trade Representative).
18. REPORT OF THE SURCOMMITEEE ON INVESTMENT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON INTERNA-
TIONAL EcoNomic POLIcy REGARDING THE MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY (2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/2009/131098.htm.
19. ACIEP Report On Model BIT Lacks Consensus On Critical Issues, INSIDE US TRADE, Oct. 2, 2009.
20. Press Release, Office of U.S. Trade Representative, United States and Mauritius Launch Investment
Treaty Talks (Aug. 5, 2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/au-
gustlunited-states-and-mauritius-launch-investment-trear; U.S.-India BIT Talks to Start In August, But Will
Face Challenges, 27 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 29 (uly 20, 2009).
21. Id.
22. India BIT Talks To Begin Aug. 11; Model BIT Review Slated For September, WORLD TRADE ONLINE
(INSIDE WASHINGTON), July 20, 2009.
23. Press Release, Office of U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Ron Kirk Announces Plan to Move
Forward with Negotiation of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (une 22, 2009) available at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/June/ambassador-ron-kirk-announces-plan-
move-forward-negot.
24. Press Release, Office of U.S. Trade Representative, Statement from USTR Spokeswoman Carol Guth-
rie on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (July 20, 2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
about-us/press-officelpress-releases/2009/july/statement-ustr-spokeswoman-carol-guthrie-anti-counte-0
Press Release, Office of U.S. Trade Representative, The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Releases
Statement of ACTA Negotiating Partners on Recent ACTA Negotiations (Nov. 6, 2009), available at http//
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modeled after the intellectual property section of the United States-Korea Free Trade
Agreement. 25
Several non-profit groups have alleged that the ACTA negotiations lack transparency.26
In 2008, these groups sued the Bush administration under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) to obtain a copy of the draft treaty text.27 This suit was dropped in July 2009,
when the Obama administration announced that it would continue the previous adminis-
tration's classification of the negotiations as exempt from FOIA for national security rea-
sons.28 Since then, the USTR has allowed certain outside groups to see the working draft
text pursuant to a nondisclosure agreement. 29 In addition, a summary of the status of
ACTA negotiations has been posted on USTR's website, 30 describing the treaty as having
six chapters: initial provisions and definitions; legal framework for enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights; international cooperation; enforcement practices; institutional ar-
rangements; and final provisions. 31
I. WTO and NAFTA Dispute Settlement Activity
Despite the economic downturn and an increased risk of protectionist measures, the
number of new WTO disputes in 2009 was not significantly higher than in past years. At
the time of this writing, twelve new disputes had been brought before the WTO in 2009,
as compared to a total of eighteen new disputes initiated in 2008.32 In general terms, 2009
saw a significant increase in disputes involving trade with China (seven in total), which
accounted for a majority of all WTO disputes initiated in 2009. These disputes were
mostly brought against China under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and China's Protocol of Accession to the WTO,33 but they also involved com-
plaints brought by China against the United States and the European Communities (EC)
under the GATT, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Agreement
www.uistr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/november/-office-us-trade-representative-releases-
statemen.
25. James Lim, Intellectual Property: ACTA Talks in Korea Said To Take Up Internet Piracy, Focus on Enforce-
ment, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1536, Nov. 12, 2009.
26. See, e.g., Amy Tsui, Intellectual Property: ACTA Still Too Secret, Nonprofits Tell Lawmakers as Talks In Korea
Continue, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1537, Nov. 12, 2009.
27. See Carey Lening, Intellectual Property: Citizens' Groups, Others Sue USTR Seeking Public Disclosure of
Counterfeiting Treaty, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Sept. 22, 2008.
28. See Rossella Brevetti, Intellectual Property: EEF, Public Knowledge Drop Lawsuit Seeking USTR Disclosure of
ACTA Documents, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. 890 (BNA), July 2, 2009.
29. Lim, supra note 25.
30. Office of U.S. Trade Representative, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement-Summary of Key Ele-
ments under Discussion Background, available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm-send/1479 (last visited Jan. 31,
2010).
3 1. Id.
32. See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlements: The Disputes, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop
e/dispue/dispu statuse.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2010).
33. Request for Consultations by Guatemala, China-Grants, Loans and Other Incentives, WT/DS390 (Jan.
19, 2009); Request for Consultations by United States, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Various
Raw Materials, WTIDS394 (June 23, 2009); Request for Consultations by European Community, China-
Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 1VTDS395 (une 23, 2009); Request for Consul-
tations by Mexico, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS398 (Aug. 21,
2009).
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on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
GATT (AD Agreement), and the Agreement on Safeguards.34
In VvTO dispute settlement decision-making, 2009 was a relatively calm year. Only
four Appellate Body Reports and four Panel Reports were issued, which represented a
significant decrease from the eight Appellate Body Reports and thirteen Panel Reports
that were issued in 2008.3s Two arbitration awards, under Articles 21.3(c) and 22.6 of the
DSU, respectively, were also issued in 2009.36
A. ZEROING DISPUTES
The controversy over the so-called "zeroing" methodology continued to represent a
large portion of the agenda of the DSB in 2009. In US-Continued Zeroing, the Appellate
Body confirmed its earlier rulings that the use of zeroing in administrative reviews was
inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement and Article VI.2 of the GATT.37 In a
rare separate (and concurring) opinion, one division member reasoned that although the
concept of dumping in Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement "is cast at a high level of general-
ity," it could not bear a meaning that is both exporter-specific and transaction-specific. 38
According to this member, in matters of adjudication, "there must be an end to every
great debate" and the Appellate Body "has spoken definitely" on the question of zeroing.39
Reversing the panel, the Appellate Body also held that "the use of the zeroing methodol-
ogy in successive proceedings in each of the 18 cases whereby anti-dumping duties are
maintained" constituted measures that can be challenged in WTO proceedings. 40
From a systemic standpoint, the most significant ruling in US-Continued Zeroing, was
the Appellate Body's interpretation of Article 17.6(ii) of the AD Agreement. Critics of the
Appellate Body's jurisprudence on zeroing charge that it ignored the more deferential
standard of review contained in the second sentence of that provision, which requires
WTO panels to uphold domestic AD measures whenever these rest on a "permissible
interpretation" of the AD Agreement. The Appellate Body clarified that the first and
second sentences of Article 17.6(ii) of the AD Agreement apply sequentially, which sug-
gests that the second sentence of Article 17.6(ii) only applies in cases where application of
customary rules of treaty interpretation (Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties) give rise to "an interpretative range."<4 The Appellate Body, how-
ever, noted that such "interpretative range" could not contemplate interpretations with
"mutually contradictory" results.42
34. Request for Consultations by China, United States-Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from
China, WT/DS392 (Apr. 17, 2009); Request for Consultations by China, European Communities-Definitive
Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397 (July 31, 2009); Request for
Consultations by China, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck
Tires from China, WT/DS398 (Sept. 14, 2009).
35. See WTO Dispute Settlement Reports, http://www.worldtradelaw.net (last visited Jan. 18, 2009).
36. Id.
37. See Appellate Body Report, US-Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/
R (Feb. 4 2009).
38. See id. 1 307.
39. See id. 312.
40. See id. 1 171.
41. See id. T 312.
42. See id. 9 273.
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The zeroing saga continued to unfold in the compliance proceedings in US-Zeroing
(EC) and US-Zeroing (7apan).43 These disputes concerned the temporal scope of the U.S.
implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the original cases,
which condemned the use of zeroing in different AD proceedings. Both panels and the
Appellate Body rejected the U.S. argument that its implementation obligation to eliminate
zeroing applied only with respect to imports taking place after the end of the "reasonable
period of time" for implementation under Article 21.5 of the DSU. In the US-Zeroing
(EC) compliance proceeding, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that the rec-
ommendations and rulings of the DSB in the original case required the United States to
eliminate zeroing in any determination made after the end of the reasonable period of
time but did not cover the assessment of duties based on any determination made with
zeroing before that date.44 The Appellate Body reasoned that the U.S. implementation
obligations after the end of the reasonable period of time also covered the assessment of
duties and any "consequent measures" that "mechanically derive" from the assessment of
duties, such as the actual collection and liquidation of duties, and the issuance of liquida-
tion or assessment instructions. 45 Nonetheless, the Appellate Body in US-Zeroing (EC)
did not express a view as to whether the U.S. implementation obligations also extended to
actions to liquidate duties on the basis of determinations made with zeroing before the
end of the reasonable period of time, in cases where such actions have been delayed as a
result of domestic judicial proceedings.44
This issue was resolved in the subsequent US-Zeroing (7apan) appeal, in which the Ap-
pellate Body reasoned that Articles 3.7, 19.1, 21.1, 21.3, and 21.5 of the DSU required
cessation of all WTO-inconsistent conduct immediately upon adoption of the DSB's rec-
ommendations and rulings, or at the latest by the end of the reasonable period of time.4 7
Thus, according to the Appellate Body, the fact that collection of AD duties was delayed
as a result of domestic judicial proceedings did not provide a valid justification for the
failure to comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings by the end of the reasona-
ble period of time.48
At the procedural level, the Appellate Body in US-Zeroing (EC) also addressed the juris-
diction of panels under DSU Article 21.5. Relying on the "nexus-based" test developed by
the Appellate Body in US-Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5-Canada),49 all Members of the
Division hearing this appeal agreed that the jurisdiction of compliance panels may extend
to measures that share a sufficiently close nexus with the DSB rulings in the original
dispute and with the "declared" measures taken to comply. When applying this test to
compliance measures challenged by the EC, however, the Division disagreed on whether
43. See Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (EQ (Article 21.5-EQ, WT/IDS294/AB/RW (May 14, 2009);
Panel Report, US-Zeroing (EQ (Article 21.5-EQ, WT/DS294/RW(Dec. 17, 2008); Appellate Body Report,
US-Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5-Japan), WTI/DS322/AB/RW (Aug. 18, 2009); Panel Report, US-Zeroing
(Japan) (Article 21.5-Japan), WT/DS322/RW (Apr. 24, 2009).
44. Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5-EC), 274.
45. Id. 306, 310.
46. See id. 314.
47. Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5-Japan), 169.
48. See id. ' 267.
49. Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to certain
Softwood Lumber from Canada, 77, WT/DS257/ABIRW Gan. 19, 2004) (adopted Dec. 5, 2005), available at
http-//www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/257abrw e.pdf.
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the compliance panel had jurisdiction over two specific administrative review determina-
tions made after the Section 129 determinations (where elimination of zeroing led to rev-
ocation of the AD duty orders). The majority believed that use of zeroing in those
administrative reviews provided the necessary link with the DSB rulings.50 But a dissenter
reasoned that because no cash deposit rates reflecting zeroing were imposed because of
these administrative reviews, those administrative reviews lacked any requisite link with
DSB rulings or declared compliance measures, and their final results could not "under-
mine or negate the impact" of the "declared" measure taken to comply.5
These findings illustrate the practical difficulties involved in applying a "nexus-based"
test of panel jurisdiction under DSU Article 21.5, and suggest the need for further
clarification.
B. U.S./CHINA-IP RIGHTS, PUBLICATIONS, AND AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTS
The remaining 2009 DSB agenda was primarily two challenges launched by the United
States against China on intellectual property rights and distribution services for reading
materials and audiovisual entertainment products.
In China-Intellectual Property Rights, the United States was partially successful in its
challenge against certain provisions of Chinese intellectual property laws. 52 The panel
found that Article 4(1) of China's Copyright Law was inconsistent with Article 5(1) of the
Berne Convention (1971), as incorporated by Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, be-
cause it denied copyright protection to works that have failed content review in China,
and to the deleted portion of works edited to satisfy content review. But the panel found
that the United States had failed to make a prima facie case of a violation of TRIPS Article
9.1 with respect to works never submitted or awaiting results of content review in China
and unedited versions of works for which an edited version has been approved for distri-
bution in China.53 The United States also successfully challenged provisions of China's
Customs Regulations that permitted the auctioning of confiscated counterfeit trademark
goods. The panel found that Article 27 of China's Customs Regulations is inconsistent
with the fourth sentence of Article 46 as incorporated in TRIPS Article 59 because it
permitted the release of counterfeit goods into commercial channels after merely remov-
ing the unlawful trademark.54
Finally, the United States failed in its claim that China acted inconsistently with TRIPS
Article 61 in not providing criminal procedures and penalties for commercial-scale trade-
mark counterfeiting and copyright piracy. In essence, the panel found that the United
States failed to prove its claim that certain thresholds under Chinese criminal law excluded
from prosecution counterfeiting of trademarks or pirating of copyrights on a "commercial
scale."55 The panel rejected U.S. evidence (consisting mostly of industry estimates, news-
50. See Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5-EC), T 252.
51. See id. T 267.
52. See Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
WT/DS362/R Gan. 26, 2009), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/362R-00.
doc.
53. See id. 19 7.103, 7.117.
54. See id. 9 7.385.
55. See id. $ 7.632, 7.668.
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paper articles, and other press reports), as anecdotal, vague, or lacking credibility. Neither
the United States nor China appealed these findings, and the panel report in
China-Intellectual Property Rights was adopted by the DSB on March 20, 2009.
In the other major trade dispute involving China in 2009, the United States successfully
challenged measures restricting trade and distribution in China of publications, audiovi-
sual home entertainment products, sound recordings, and films for theatrical release. In
China -Publications and Audiovisual Products, the panel found that certain Chinese measures
were inconsistent with "WTO-plus" commitments in Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of China's
WTO Accession Protocol because they failed to grant foreign-owned enterprises and for-
eign individuals the right to trade publications and audiovisual products in China.5 6 In its
analysis, the panel rejected China's contention that the challenged measures regulated
trade in services, therefore rendering inapplicable China's trading rights commitments in
Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of China's Accession Protocol with respect to goods. The panel also
rejected China's defense that its measures were justified under GATT Article XX(a) to
protect public morals. The panel did not take a position as to whether GATT Article XX
may be available as a defense to a violation of an agreement other than the GAT, such as
China's Accession Protocol (an interesting systemic issue that the Appellate Body might
address). Even assuming that such a defense were available, however, the panel deter-
mined that China did not establish that its measures were "necessary" under Article XX(a),
because alternative and less trade-restrictive measures were available.
The panel also upheld United States claims that Chinese measures restricting distribu-
tion services for reading materials, electronic sound recordings, and audiovisual home en-
tertainment products were inconsistent with Article XVII national treatment
requirements, and with China's Article XVI market access commitments.
Both China and the United States appealed some of the panel's findings. At the time of
this writing, the Appellate Body had not issued its report.
C. NAFTA PANEL REPORTS
In Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada,57 a bi-national panel granted Com-
merce's motion to dismiss an action brought by a Canadian lumber producer who claimed
that the company was entitled to the results of an administrative review, despite the 2006
Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA). The complainant reasoned that had the review
found a de minimis CVD margin, the company would have been excluded from the SLA.
The bi-national panel found that any alleged injury was not a result of the administrative
review, but rather the result of the SLA itself, which the panel had no jurisdiction to
review.
56. See Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publica-
tions and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12, 2009), available at http:I/docsonline.wto.
org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/363R-00.doc.
57. Article 1904 Binational Panel Review, Certain Sofrwood Lumber Products From Canada; Final Results of
Countervailing Duty Administrative Review and Rescission of Certain Company-Specific Reviews (the "Final Re-
sults"), Secretariat File No. USA-CDA-2005-1904-01 (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://registry.nafta-sec-
alena.org/cmdocuments/35el48ef-82a8-4eaa-b7lb-4803d93ff43f.pdf.
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IV. U.S. Trade Remedy Cases
A. ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS
1. 421 Tires Proceeding
On September 11, 2009, President Obama provided import relief in response to market
disruption from imports of certain passenger vehicle and light truck tires from China.58
This action affirmed the July 9, 2009, report of the ITC investigation under Section 421
of the 1974 Trade Act. This was the first instance that a President had affirmed an ITC
Section 421 determination.
In its report, the ITC determined that certain passenger vehicle and light truck tires
from China were being imported into the United States in such increased quantities or
under such conditions as to cause market disruption to the domestic producers.59
The ITC also determined that subject imports were increasing rapidly in both absolute
and relative terms.60 According to the ITC, the subject imports from China increased
throughout the period of investigation in absolute terms, with the greatest increase in
2008.61 The ITC also found that the ratio of subject imports relative to U.S. production
and to U.S. apparent consumption rose throughout the period, again with the highest
ratio in 2008.62 Thus, the ITC determined that the increases in subject imports were
"large, rapid, and continuing at the end of the period,"63 and that the first statutory crite-
rion for finding market disruption was "fully satisfied."64
Next, the ITC determined that the domestic industry was materially injured or
threatened with material injury by the subject imports. All indicators "were at their lowest
levels in 2008, as were the industry's financial results,"65 with the data indicating declines
in U.S. producers' average production capacity, capacity utilization, production, and ship-
ments.66 U.S. employment also declined each year during the period examined, as did the
number of hours worked and operating income.67
58. Proclamation No. 8414, Proclamation to Address Market Disruption from Imports of Certain Passen-
ger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the People's Republic of China, published at 74 Fed. Reg. 47,861
(Sept. 17, 2009).
59. Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires From China, Investigation No. TA-421-7, 2009 ITC
LEXIS 1242, at *1 July 2009), available at http://www.usitc.gov/trade.remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/investiga-
tions/2009/421_tires/PDFfTires%20-%20Publication%204085.pdf.
60. Id.
61. Id. ("The quantity of subject imports rose by 215.5 percent between 2004 and 2008, by 53.7 percent
between 2006 and 2007, and by 10.8 percent between 2007 and 2008. The value of subject imports rose even
more rapidly, increasing by 294.5 percent between 2004 and 2008, by 60.2 percent between 2006 and 2007,
and by 19.8 percent between 2007 and 2008." (citing Table C-1, at *365)).
62. Id. ("The ratio of subject imports to U.S. production increased by 22.0 percentage points between 2004
and 2008, with the two largest year-to-year increases occurring at the end of the period in 2007 and 2008.
The ratio of subject imports to U.S. apparent consumption increased by 12.0 percentage points during the
period examined, with the two largest year-to-year increases also occurring at the end of the period in 2007
and 2008." (citing Tables 11-2 & V-1, at *227, *286)).
63. Id. at *26.
64. Id. at *27.
65. Id. at *34-35.
66. Id. at *35-37.
67. Id. at *38-39.
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Finally, the ITC determined that the rapidly increasing imports were a significant cause
of material injury. Given the close substitutability of the domestic product and the subject
imports combined with underselling by significant and growing margins, the ITC found
that the rapidly increasing subject imports had caused a market distortion that materially
injured the domestic industry. 68
In light of the ITC's determination, and on the confidential recommendation of the
USTR, on September 11, 2009, President Obama announced that effective September 26,
the United States would impose a thirty-five percent tariff in the first year of the three-
year safeguard, followed by a thirty percent and twenty-five percent tariff respectively the
following years. 69 This fell short of the ITC recommendation of a three-year safeguard
tariff starting at fifty-five percent in the first year, and then reduced to forty-five and
thirty-five percent. Nonetheless, this was the first time a president had ever affirmed an
ITC Section 421 determination.
2. Application of CVD Law to Vietnam
On April 20, 2009, Commerce initiated the first CVD investigation on exports from
Vietnam. 70 Currently, Vietnam is treated as a NMIE country in AD investigations and
administrative reviews. Vietnam is the second country considered to be a NME by Com-
merce to have the CVD law apply.71
In its preliminary determination, Commerce found no statutory bar to applying CVD
law to imports from NME countries like Vietnam.72 Commerce examined a "snap-shot"
of Vietnam's economy and salient features or characteristics of the production, finance
and trade spheres, the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector, land administration, and Viet-
nam's trade and investment regimes. 3 Commerce determined that, in contrast with the
pervasive role of the State in a centrally planned economy, SOEs are no longer the sole
occupants of the economic space in Vietnam.74 Commerce also noted that Vietnam had
reformed many SOEs in order to make its "production system more flexible and respon-
sive to changes in the internal and external economic environment." 75 Commerce also
68. Id. at *59-60.
69. White House Announces Three-Year TariffSafeguard On Chinese Tires Falling Short OfITC Recommendation,
WORLD TRADE ONuINE, Sept. 12, 2009, availahle at http://www.insidetrade.com/secure/display.asp?dn=912
2009_safeguard&f=wto2002.ask.
70. See Int'l Trade Administration, Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags From the Socialist Republic of Viet-
nam: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation and Request for Public Comment on the Application of
the Countervailing Duty Law to Imports From the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 74 Fed. Reg. 19,064 (Apr.
27, 2009).
71. Int'l Trade Administration, Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Final Antidumping Duty Determination, 74 Fed. Reg. 45,811 (Sept. 4, 2009) (the first
NME to have CVD law applied to was the People's Republic of China); see also Issues and Decision Memo-
randum for the Final Determination in the Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper
from the People's Republic of China (PRC), Comment 1, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,632 (Oct. 25, 2007).
72. Commerce also indicated that the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement permits
CVDs on subsidized imports from member countries and does not exempt non-market economy imports.
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found that Vietnam had distinguished itself from centrally planned economies by making
production factors more accessible and deregulating both input and output prices,76 and
that Vietnam no longer monopolizes international trade, stating that the majority of
Vietnamese exports are from foreign invested enterprises and domestic private firms.77 As
a result of these changes in Vietnam's economy, Commerce "believe[s] that it is possible
to determine whether the [Government of Vietnam] has bestowed a benefit upon a
Vietnamese producer . . . and whether any such benefit is specific." 7 8
3. Calculation of AD Duties Using Quarterly Costs
In May 2008, Commerce published a request for comment on the development of a
predictable methodology to determine whether the use of shorter-period cost averaging
would be more appropriate when there are significant cost changes throughout a period of
investigation (POI) or period of review (POR).79 Through administrative reviews, Com-
merce has developed a practice for determining when the use of shorter cost averaging
periods is more appropriate than its established practice of using annual cost averages.
Section 773(b)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, states that sales may be disre-
garded if they have been made at prices which represent less than the cost of production
(COP) of a product. In its request for comments, Commerce noted that although section
773(b)(3) of the Act states that the COP is calculated using a period that would ordinarily
permit the production of the foreign like product, the Act does not dictate the method of
calculating COP or provide a definition for the term "period" in calculating COP and
constructed value (CV).s0
Commerce's practice was to use a single weighted-average COP that applies to the
entire period of review or investigation. But Commerce also has a long-standing practice
of applying alternative cost averaging methods where it determines that its normal annual
average costs would lead to skewed data and inappropriate comparisons.8' These situa-
tions include high inflation, rapid technological advancements, and extraordinary raw ma-
terial cost volatility.
In determining to allow quarterly cost calculations, Commerce stated that where alter-
native cost averaging methods were requested, it examines: "(1) whether the cost changes
throughout the POI/POR were significant; and (2) whether sales during the shorter aver-
aging period could be accurately linked with the COP [or constructed] value during the
same averaging period." 82 These two prongs represent the threshold for Commerce to
76. Id. at 8.
77. Id. at 9-10.
78. Id. at 11.
79. Int'l Trade Administration, Antidumping Methodologies for Proceedings that Involve Significant Cost
Changes Throughout the Period of Investigation (POI)/Period of Review (POR) that May Require Using
Shorter Cost Averaging Periods; Request for Comment, 73 Fed. Reg. 26,364 (May 9, 2008).
80. Id. at 26365.
8 1. Id.
82. See, e.g., Int'l Trade Administration, Issues and Decisions for the Final Results of the Sixth Administra-
tive Review of the Antidumping Duty Order on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium (2006-2007), 73
Fed. Reg. 75,398, cmt. 4 (Dec. 11, 2008), available at http-J/ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/belgium/E8-29410-1.
pdf; Int'l Trade Administration, Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of Certain Welded Stainless Steel
Pipes from the Republic of Korea: Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results, 74 Fed. Reg.
31,242, cmts. lb & Ic (June 22, 2009).
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deviate from its normal practice. For the first prong regarding significance, Commerce
established that a twenty-five percent change in cost was "significant,"83 and declared a
threshold of twenty-five percent annual inflation sufficient to deviate from its normal an-
nual average cost methodology.84 For the second prong, Commerce stated that its defini-
tion of linkage does not require a direct link between specific sales and specific production
costs.85 Rather, Commerce relies on whether there is a positive "correlation between a
company's underlying costs and final sales prices."86 Commerce noted, however, that re-
quiring too strict a standard for linkage would unreasonably preclude this remedy for
commodity-type products where there is no pricing mechanism in place.87
4. An Update on Targeted Dumping
The 2008 edition of the IrERNATIONAL LAWYER Year-in-Review discussed Com-
merce's changes in its targeted dumping methodology and the withdrawal of the targeted
dumping regulations.88 In 2009, Commerce's practice related to targeted dumping re-
mained in flux.
In its Preliminary Determination of the Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from Indonesia in-
vestigation, Commerce conducted customer, regional, and time-period targeted-dumping
analyses for the respondent and time-period targeted-dumping analysis using the method-
ology adopted in Nails from China and used most recently in Certain New Pneumatic Off-
The-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China.89 Commerce recognized, however, that
its targeted dumping regulations had been withdrawn.
Under its prior regulations, Commerce would have normally limited the average-to-
transaction methodology to only those sales that constitute targeted dumping. But in
light of the withdrawn regulation, Commerce now considers the following three options:
* Apply the average-to-transaction methodology just to sales found to be targeted as
the withdrawn regulation directed and, consistent with [its] average-to-transaction
practice, do not offset any margins found on these transactions.
* Apply the average-to-transaction methodology to all sales to the customer or time
period found to be targeted, not just those specific sales found to be targeted, and
consistent with [its] average-to-transaction practice, do not offset any margins found
on these transactions.
* Apply the average-to-transaction methodology to all sales and, consistent with [its]
average-to-transaction practice, do not offset any margins found on these
transactions.90





88. Pablo M. Bentes et al., International Trade, 43 INT'L LAw. 335 (2009).
89. Int'l Trade Administration, Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from Indonesia, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,807
(Nov. 3, 2009); see generally Certain New Pneumatic Off-The-Road Tires from the People's Republic of
China: Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Partial Affirmative Determina-
tion of Critical Circumstances, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,485 (uly 15, 2008).
90. Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from Indonesia, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,807.
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Commerce stated that comments had been received regarding the price-comparison
methodology in response to the Withdrawal of Regulation.9' Because consideration of
those comments is still underway, Commerce applied the average-to-transaction method-
ology to any targeted sales and applied the average-to-average methodology to the re-
maining non-targeted sales in that investigation.92
B. COURT DECISIONS
1. Supreme Court Decision: The Application of AD Law to International Trade in Services
In United States v. Eurodif, S.A., the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari for the first
time to an AD appeal.93 The case involved low enriched uranium sales transactions where
U.S. energy companies or utilities provide feed uranium and only pay in cash for the
service of enrichment in a foreign country. Consistent with the holding of the CIT and
its own precedent, the Federal Circuit had found that these transactions constituted the
sale of services, and that Commerce's interpretation of the statute was contrary to its plain
language, which covers only merchandise, and not services.94 The Supreme Court framed
the issue as "whether the Commerce Department's way of seeing the transactions as sales
of goods rather than services reflects a permissible interpretation and application" of the
U.S. AD statute.95 The Supreme Court held that it did.
The Court found that "[w]here a domestic buyer's cash and an untracked, fungible
commodity are exchanged with a foreign contractor for a substantially transformed ver-
sion of the same commodity, the Commerce Department may reasonably treat the trans-
action as the sale of a good" under the statute, even when, as in this case, the contracts
were designated as the provision of enrichment services. 96 The Supreme Court reasoned
that to allow contracts structured as the sale of services to avoid AD duties "would prima-
rily chastise the uncreative." 97
Regarding the deference due to Commerce, the Supreme Court's holding is based on
the Chevron standard, but involves a twist on the original reasoning of the Chevron court.
In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that administrative agency regulations, promulgated
within the authority delegated by Congress and promulgated with notice and comment
rulemaking within Section 553 of the Administrative Procedures Act, should be accorded
appropriate deference by a court, while an informal agency decision would not.98 As the
implementing agency in Eurodif, Commerce had promulgated a relevant regulation re-
garding tolling (the processing of a product for a set fee without a transfer in ownership of
the product), but it repealed the regulation shortly before the Supreme Court oral argu-
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See generally United States v. Eurodif S.A., 129 S. Ct. 878, 882 (2009) (the petition for certiorari was
jointly filed by the Departments of Justice, Commerce, State, and Defense-adding to the unusual posture of
this antidumping appeal).
94. See Eurodif S.A. v. United States, 411 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Florida Power &r Light
Co. v. United States, 307 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
95. Eurodif 129 S. Ct. at 882.
96. Id. at 890.
97. Id.
98. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
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ment to have these issues decided on a case by case basis.99 Thus, the implementing
agency's case-specific decision prevailed over a potentially dispositive regulation. The Su-
preme Court found the tolling regulation has "been withdrawn . . . and cannot now con-
strain the Commerce Department's interpretive authority under Chevron." 00 This
stands in stark contrast to the original Chevron court. In Eurodif, the Supreme Court
stated that "the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambigui-
ties of the statute with the implementing agency."' 0 ' Eurodif makes plain the devolution
of Chevron from its origins in notice and comment rulemaking into deference toward ad-
ministrative agency case-specific adjudication. The Federal Circuit's decisions of 2009
echo this theme.
2. Federal Circuit Decisions
In Ningbo Dafa Chemical Fiber Co. Ltd., v. United States, the Federal Circuit's decision is
replete with language regarding the deference due to Commerce's AD determinations.102
The Federal Circuit upheld Commerce's application of adverse facts available under 19
U.S.C. Section 1677e(a) to a foreign producer that did not provide information in the
form and manner requested by Commerce. 0 3 The court took pains to describe the defer-
ence due: (1) the "legislative history .. . thus reveals that Congress intended § 1677e(a) to
provide Commerce with gap-filling power . . .;" (2) "this court gives Commerce's inter-
pretation of antidumping laws significant deference because of its special expertise in ad-
ministering antidumping law;"104 and (3) that "Commerce is the 'master of antidumping
law' and reviewing courts must accord deference to the agency in its selection and devel-
opment of proper methodologies."10 5
Similarly, in PAM, S.P.A. v. United States, the Federal Circuit found that the deference
due stems from "Commerce's special expertise in antidumping cases." 0 6 In upholding
Commerce's application of adverse facts available (AFA), the court found that "Com-
merce's discretion in applying an AFA margin is particularly great when a respondent is
uncooperative by failing to provide or withholding information." 0 7
In NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States,'08 however, the Federal Circuit declined to
defer to Commerce's determination in a sunset review regarding whether dumping is
likely to recur if an antidumping order is terminated.109 The Federal Circuit vacated the
CIT decision affirming Commerce because the Commerce determination was "a devia-
99. Withdrawal of Regulations Governing the Treatment of Subcontractors, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,517 (Mar. 28,
2008). DOC stated that it was "not replacing this regulation with a new regulation," but "is returning to a
case-by-case adjudication, until additional experience allows the Department to gain greater understanding of
the problem."
100. Eurodif 129 S. Ct. at 887 n.7.
101. Id. at 887 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)).
102. See generally Ningbo Dafa Chem. Fiber Co. Ltd. v. United States, 580 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
103. Id. at 1252.
104. Id. at 1255-56.
105. Id. at 1259 (quoting Thai Pineapple Pub. Co., v. United States, 187 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
106. PAM, S.P.A. v. United States, 582 F.3d 1336, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
107. Id. at 1340.
108. See generally NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
109. Id. at 1326.
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tion from otherwise consistent practice of Commerce."'lo Commerce's practice regarding
sunset reviews was memorialized in a Sunset Policy Bulletin. II The court found that the
Policy Bulletin and past cases established a practice from which Commerce needed to
adequately explain any deviation.1 2 The court further instructed that "while its explana-
tions do not have to be perfect, the path of Commerce's decision must be reasonably
discernible to a reviewing court."" 3  The court remanded the case for such an
explanation.
3. CIT Appeals of Commerce Determinations
In GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States,14 the central issue was whether CVD
law may be applied to NMEs, including China, without changing Commerce's AD prac-
tice regarding NMEs."s Before 2007, Commerce did not apply CVD law to NMEs be-
cause of the difficulty to disaggregate government actions in a way to identify subsidies.
Instead, the effect of economic intervention was captured by Commerce's application of
AD law by valuing "factors of production" in a market economy.116 But Commerce de-
parted from this consistent practice in this CVD proceeding. In reviewing Commerce's
decision, the court found that "while Commerce may have the authority to apply CVD
law" to NMEs, the statute is not clear as to "how Commerce is to account for the overlap"
between the AD and CVD duties." 7 The court remanded the matter for "Commerce to
forgo the imposition of CVDs on the merchandise at issue or for Commerce to adopt
additional policies and procedures to adapt its NME AD and CVD methodologies to
account for the imposition of CVD remedies."" 8
In 2009, the efficacy of NAFTA binational panel review was tested in Canadian Wheat
Board v. United States.119 There, the CIT affirmed its 2006 decision in Tembec Inc. v.
United States, that AD or CVD deposits on unliquidated import entries must be refunded
when a NAFTA panel invalidates an AD or CVD order.120 The court reasoned that al-
though NAFTA binational panels cannot enjoin liquidation, the statutory scheme provides
for continued suspension of liquidation pending binational panel review.121 Upon com-
pletion of such review, duties collected under the invalidated order must be refunded.
Unlike Tembec, however, the Canadian Wheat Board decision was appealed to the Federal
Circuit, which will rule on this issue of critical importance to NAFTA binational panel
review.
110. Id. at 1329.
111. See generally Policies Regarding Conduct of Five-Year (Sunset) Review, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,871 (Apr. 16,
1998).
112. NMB Singapore Ltd., 557 F.3d at 1328-29.
113. Id. at 1328-29.
114. GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009).
115. Id. at 1234.
116. Id. at 1236, 1245. ("The NIME AD statute is designed to account for government intervennon in an
NME country's economy, including resulting price distortion.").
117. Id. at 1240.
118. Id. at 1251.
119. See generally Canadian Wheat Bd. V. United States, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009).
120. Canadian Wheat Bd., 637 F. Supp. 2d at 1336; Tembec Inc. v. United States, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1357
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2006).
121. Canadian Wheat Board, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 1334.
VOL. 44, NO. I
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 109
The CIT made several other determinations of interest:
* In NME cases in which Commerce's calculation of normal value is based on its "fac-
tors of production" analysis, Commerce must construct the product's normal value as
it would have been if the NME country were a market economy. 122
* Commerce was not obligated to adjust margins calculated in prior review retroac-
tively to reflect a WTO decision. The Court found that the implementation of a
WTO decision is prospective only.123
* The CIT remanded a Commerce decision for using overly broad model matching
criteria in comparing home market and U.S. market prices in its AD calculations. 124
* Industrial users or purchasers of the subject merchandise do not have standing to
appeal a Commerce AD determination.125
* Where Commerce has an established practice, Commerce has the authority to
change its practice or methodology but must adequately explain and justify such
change. The Court remanded a Commerce determination for further explanation
regarding its change in practice regarding quarterly versus annual cost averaging.126
4. CIT Appeals of ITC Determinations
The CIT issued several decisions of note regarding ITC determinations. The applica-
tion of the Federal Circuit's Bratsk/Mittel Steel causation standard continued to be a
theme, as well as the appropriate standard of causation in ITC's sunset reviews.127
The Bratsk/Mittel Steel causation standard established by the Federal Circuit applies to
the ITC's analysis of whether non-subject imports have captured or are likely to capture
market share previously held by subject imports. In NSK Corp. v. United States, the CIT,
by Judge Barzilay, considered a motion for rehearing in light of the Federal Circuit's
evolving jurisprudence on the causation standard, as reflected in its 2008 Mittel Steel deci-
sion.128 The CIT held that, while the Mittel Steel decision did represent a development of
the law regarding the causation standard, and that this development was relevant to sunset
reviews, it did not reveal significant flaws or manifest error in the CIT's earlier decision,
and thus denied the motion for rehearing.129
In contrast, in Nucor Corp. v. United States, the CIT, by Judge Carmen, found that the
Federal Circuit's decision in Mittel Steel "explicitly links the Bratsk analysis with the final
phase investigation statue, supporting a strong inference that the final phase investigation
is the only context in which the Bratsk/Mittel Steel analysis should be applied."' 0 In
122. Zhengzhou Harmoni Spice Co. Ltd. v. United States, 617 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009).
123. NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1250 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009); Corns Staal
BY. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1386 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2008).
124. Union Steel v. United States, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1310 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009).
125. Ad Noc Utils. Group v. United States, 625 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1332 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009).
126. Habas Dinai Ve Tibbi Gazlar Istihsal Endustrisi A.S. v. United States, 625 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1356 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2009).
127. Mittel Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States, 542 F.3d 867, 878-89 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Bratsk Aluminum
Smelter v. United States, 444 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
128. NSK Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1358-59 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009).
129. Id. at 1371-72 ("That the Federal Circuit uses language to discuss causation principle in the setting of
an investigation does not mean those principles are inapplicable to sunset reviews.").
130. Nucor Corp. v. United States, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1380 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009).
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Nucor, the CIT declined to extend Bratsk/Mittel Steel to ITC sunset reviews.131 Thus, the
NSK and Nucor decisions imply a division among CIT judges regarding the applicability of
the Bratsk/Mittel Steel causation standard to ITC sunset reviews.
In the earlier NSK Corp. v. United States decision preceding the motion for rehearing,
the CIT had remanded the ITC's sunset review decision for failure to establish a causal
link between subject imports and the likely future injury.132 The court found that, in light
of Bratsk/Mittel Steel, the ITC had not adequately assessed why subject imports would be
"more than a minimal or tangential cause of likely injury given the significant price under-
selling by non-subject imports." 33 The court further remanded the ITC's decision to
cumulate subject imports from the United Kingdom, which the court found required ad-
ditional justification to support a finding that such imports were likely to have a discerni-
ble adverse impact sufficient to justify cumulation.134
V. Legislative Activity
Developing countries got a reprieve in this year's small flurry of legislative activity. The
Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) and Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
trade preference programs, benefiting over 130 developing countries, were extended
through December 31, 2010, just as they were about to expire.135 Trade adjustment assis-
tance (TAA) programs that assist trade-impacted workers, firms and farmers also got a
reprieve. Congress reauthorized and expanded a number of the TAA programs through
December 31, 2010, including extending TAA to service sector workers and firms, and
ensuring automatic eligibility for workers suffering from unfair trade and import surges 36
In contrast, there was no progress on the three pending free trade agreements 37 or other
trade-related legislation.
131. Id. at 1382.
132. NSK Corp. v. United States, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1323 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1324-25.
135. See Pub. L. No. 111-124, § 2, 123 Stat. 3484 (2009). The ATPA, under which the United States ex-
tends special duty treatment to imports from Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia that meet domestic con-
tent and other requirements, went into effect on December 4, 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-182, 105 Stat. 1236.
Later, it was renewed and modified under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act on August
6, 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 1023 (codified is amended at 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 3201-3202 (2005)).
Trade preferences for Bolivia were allowed to expire on June 30, 2009, because the President determined that
Bolivia failed to meet ATPA eligibility requirements. Pub. L. No. 110-436, § 1, 122 Stat. 4976 (2008).
Under the GSP program, the United States provides preferential duty-free entry for more than 4,600 prod-
ucts from over 130 designated beneficiary countries and territories in the developing world. The GSP pro-
gram was instituted on January 1, 1976, and authorized under the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2461 et seq.)
for a ten-year period. It has been renewed periodically since then.
136. See Pub. L. No. 111-5, Division B, Subtitle I, 123 Stat. 115, 367 (2009).
137. Three free trade agreements signed before the June 30, 2007, expiry of trade promotion authority were
pending at the outset of 2009. Those same three agreements remain pending at the end of 2009. The United
States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement was signed on November 22, 2006, and subsequently
amended, on June 28, 2007; The United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement was signed on June 28,
2007; and the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement was signed on June 30, 2007. See generally Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative, Bilateral Trade Agreements, available at http-//www.ustr.gov/TradeAgree-
ments/Bilateral/SectionIndex.html.
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As we head into the politically-charged 2010 mid-term elections, trade enforcement
legislation likely will take center stage. Congress will also likely tackle a broad reform
effort for all preference programs, Customs reauthorization legislation, and legislation to
reform oversight of currency exchange rates, including use of the antidumping and/or
countervailing duty laws to address the effect of currency misalignment on U.S. industries.
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